SNAPSHOTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FORESTRY NETWORKS: COUNTRY AND NETWORK STUDIES

This is one of series of reports commissioned by CIFOR as part of its study of 'Learning from International Community Forestry Networks'. All these studies were carried out within a tight budget and very brief time frame, which necessarily implied an anecdotal and impressionistic method of data collection. CIFOR and the authors acknowledge that the findings in these studies are thus partial. In our view, however, they do provide interesting insights into the complex world of networking and advocacy and are thus being made available to help networkers and those promoting community forestry to reflect on and, hopefully, improve their work.

BRIDGING THE GAP:

CHALLENGES TO COMMUNITY FORESTRY NETWORKING IN INDONESIA

Marcus Colchester[1]

'There is a gap between the high tech. world and the real life of communities in the field. It is not just a gap of resources, it is more like a conflict of civilizations – the social transformation is not done well. The gap is between those who are highly educated and the illiterate peasantry. So now that *reformasi* has come, we find that the pro-people activists are actually urban and academics, not people who have lived in the villages. It is a huge gap… a class gap… a status gap.'

Laurel Heydir, 23/5/2002

---

[1] Marcus Colchester, Director, Forest Peoples Programme: marcus@fppwrm.gn.apc.org

---

[2] A number of key figures in the community forestry movement in Indonesia could not be reached during this study for a variety of reasons among these Dani Munggoro, Awang San Afri, Heru Iswantoro and Sih Yuniati.

Executive Summary:
Indonesia is two things: a unified country and a plurality of distinct peoples governed by their own customs. The tension between these two underlies many of the problems and challenges that Indonesia's forests and peoples face today. Having once been fully forested, and home to nearly one fifth of the world's biodiversity, Indonesia is now badly deforested and rates of deforestation continue to increase, exacerbated by recent steps to decentralize control of forests to district authorities.

Indonesia exemplifies to an unusual degree the intrinsic political, social and institutional weakenesses of 'scientific forestry'. A centralized approach to forest management has denied community rights, favoured the emergence of a corrupt elite, established a technocratic forestry bureaucracy and overseen a sustained overharvesting of timber and misallocation of forest lands for over fifty years. The political economy of logging which has resulted, has created huge barriers to those promoting community forestry. Additional obstacles are erected by the government's ethnocentric and assimilationist social policies towards forest dwellers, a land tenure system that provides very weak recognition of customary rights and forest tenures which deny collective rights to forest lands.

The government's community forestry programme only really got going in the 1990s. Despite set backs, this programme has established a co-management approach allowing communities which incorporate as cooperatives to gain 25 year leaseholds on unencumbered State forest lands. The programme has mainly been applied in degraded forest areas and among migrant farmer communities. Indonesia's experiment with decentralization now poses the main uncertainty to the future of community forestry in the country. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, successive administrations have vacillated between devolving control of land use decisions to the districts and then trying to recover it.

Community forestry has been promoted in Indonesia by a number of agencies, notably the Ford Foundation but also IGOs, aid agencies and NGOs. Networking has been an important part of this process. However, during the dictatorship the scope for NGOs to promote radical changes in forest policy was limited and most aid agencies were very cautious about what they supported. The Ford Foundation itself sought to promote change within the parameters set by government policy while at the same time encouraging the introduction of new concepts about community forestry from overseas.

The main national networking efforts got going in the late 1990s. One approach favours inclusive dialogue with government. The other advocates a more radical reform that would secure community rights and recognize the value of customary knowledge systems. None of these efforts have been well linked to grassroots organizations. The recent emergence of a social movement of 'indigenous peoples' could change this. Community mapping has proved a useful tool.

International networks have been important in training, introducing new concepts and helping local actors invoke international standards. However, national players are critical of the extent to which these networks impose their own agendas and priorities. The international networks also fail to connect with local communities. A wealth of lessons and suggestions for reform are recorded. To be more effective the international networks need to attend more to local realities, adopt agile working methods that give control to local partners, and styles of communications tailored to suit local needs. However, until it is clearer who is going to win the tug-of-war for control of forests being waged between the district and national administrations, it is hard to guess what kind of networking approaches are most appropriate.

1. Indonesia's Forests: Historical and Social Context

The idea of Indonesia as a nation emerged in the early 20th century as a response to Dutch colonialism.[3] Ever since the Youth Conference in 1928, nationalists have asserted the unity of their country and forged a concept of its unifying traditions and customs. Paradoxically, this unifying concept of *adat* (custom) derived in large part from the way the Dutch had applied a plural legal system to their dominions, in which Roman-Dutch law ruled the affairs of commerce and those of European descent, while codified customary law ruled the affairs of natives.[4] Indonesia thus emerged as revolutionary project, simultaneously affirming the unifying notion of custom while seeking to throw off imperialist exploitation in the name of international socialism.

Indonesia imagined itself as incorporating all the subject peoples of the Dutch East Indies and claimed jurisdiction over all the parts of the archipelago that the Dutch had ruled. Although originally conceived by Hatta, one the founding fathers of the independence movement, as a federation of autonomous regions, a much more centralized polity was asserted from the late 1950s onwards, in response to regional rebellions fomented by the CIA.[5] In the 1960s, even the ethnically distinct, Dutch colony of 'West Irian' (western New Guinea) was invaded and then incorporated into Indonesia, with the connivance of the United Nations, largely as a result of changes in US policies towards Indonesia.[6]

Ethnographic 'Indonesia', on the other hand, was a term coined earlier by Dutch lawyers and anthropologists as a much wider region, which included much of Malaysia and the Philippines and embraced the 600 different peoples speaking related Austronesian languages, considered to have dispersed across this part of Southeast Asia and the western Pacific islands over the past several thousand years. Modern Indonesia is now a country with a population of some 215 million made up of several hundred of these peoples,[7] scattered across some 13,000 islands of the archipelago.

Indonesia is thus two things – a unitary nation state and a plurality of distinct peoples – and the tension between these two, captured but not resolved by the nationalist slogan 'Unity in Diversity', underlies many of the problems and challenges that Indonesia's forests and peoples face today. The new project to promote 'community forestry' in Indonesia, which this report examines, has to deal with this complex reality of overlapping jurisdictions, conflicting concepts of identity and custom, plural law and cultural diversity, in which it is being implanted. Few Indonesians, much less any foreigners, truly comprehend the socially and politically diverse reality that they are dealing with.[8] Today, after forty years of centralism – mostly in the form of the Suharto dictatorship – Indonesia is again in a phase of decentralization, thereby presenting new political, legal and institutional challenges and opportunities to those promoting community forestry.

---

[3] Anderson 1983.
[4] Hooker 1978; Lev 2000; Burns 1989, 2001.
[5] Kahin and Kahin 1995
[6] Budiardjo and Soei Liong 1986.
[7] Modern Indonesia also currently embraces some 300-500 peoples speaking Papuan languages on the western part of the island of New Guinea.
[8] The author is no exception! I only claim the dubious distinction of having the wisdom to recognize my ignorance.

Forest wealth, forest loss:

Indonesia, considered to have once been almost entirely forested, contains a wide variety of very different kinds of forests, including lowland rainforest, swamp forest, peatland forest, mangroves, dry tropical forests, montane forests, savannah forests, heath forests, and dry deciduous forests. These forests are not only home to some 65 - 100 million people with very different ways of life but are stunningly biologically diverse. As *Down to Earth* notes:

> *Indonesia is one of the biologically richest countries. Although it only occupies 1.3% of the world's land area, some 17% of species on earth are found there. Its forests contain 11% of the world's plant species, 12% of mammal species, 15% of reptiles and amphibians and 17% of birds. Borneo alone has at least 3,000 species of trees; over 2,000 species of orchids and 1,000 species of ferns: over a third of these plants are unique to the island. Over 1,400 species of birds have been recorded in Indonesia; 420 species are endemic. One reason for this high biodiversity is that Indonesia lies on the Wallace line at the junction of two major biogeographical zones. To the west of Bali, including the island of Borneo, species are similar to those occurring in mainland Asia; to the east of Bali, flora and fauna typical of Australia are found such as eucalyptus trees and marsupials.[9]*

According to the best estimates currently available, from an original forest cover of near 100% (189 million hectares), Indonesia's forests still covered some 87% of the country in 1900. By the 1950s, the figure remained about the same (85%), at some 162 million hectares. Rates of deforestation then began to increase almost geometrically. With the intensification of industrial logging and transmigration in the 1970s, the surge in mining, road-building, downstream timber-processing capacity and palm oil plantations in the 1980s and the build up of the pulp-and-paper industries and forest clearance for timber plantations in the 1990s, forest loss has mounted. Huge fires linked to poor forest management have compounded the waste. Between 1950 and 1985, Indonesia lost about 44 million hectares of forests – a mean rate of about 1.2 million hectares a year. Between 1985 and 2000, a further 20 million hectares had gone and much that was left was seriously degraded, suggesting a mean rate of deforestation of over 1.5 million hectares a year. [10]

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the political and administrative chaos of regionalization has placed further pressure on forests, with current estimates putting rates of deforestation at anywhere between 2 and 3 million hectares a year. Sulawesi's moist forests have already almost all been logged over. At current rates, Sumatra's are likely to have been logged over by 2005 and those on Kalimantan by 2010.[11] Unless rates of industrial timber processing are sharply reduced, the still extensive forests of West Papua will not endure much more than a decade or two after that.

---

[9] DTE 2002:4.
[10] FWI, WRI, GFW 2002.
[11] DTE 2002; FWI, WRI, GFW 2002.

Summarizing this history, the NGO Indonesian Forest Watch, in a joint publication with the WRI and Global ForestWatch notes:

> *Deforestation in Indonesia is largely the result of a corrupt political and economic system that regarded natural resources, especially forests, as a source of revenue to be exploited for political ends and personal gain. The country's growing wood-processing and plantation crop industries proved lucrative over the years, and their profitability was used by the Suharto regime as a means to reward and control friends, family and potential allies... Indonesia today is a major producer of logs, sawnwood, plywood, woodpulp and paper, as well as palm oil, rubber and cocoa. This economic development was achieved with virtually no regard for the sustainable management of forests or the rights of local people.*[12]

2. Forest Policy :

Indonesia exemplifies, to an unusual degree, the intrinsic political, social and institutional weaknesses of 'scientific forestry'.[13] The Dutch first formalized a western system of forest management in Java at the beginning of the 19th century. Under this system, teak forest lands were arrogated to the colonial State. With questionable legality, forests were assigned to the jurisdiction of an office of the administration, forest lots were parcelled up and the rights of local communities were denied or restricted.[14] Forest laws imposing 'scientific forestry' on Javanese forests evolved between 1865 and 1920. Under these laws, different regulations were applied to forests on State lands and trees on private lands, and different restrictions and taxes imposed on cutting timber for sale and for subsistence use. As natural forests began to deplete, the forest service adopted replanting regimes to maintain stock and placed further restrictions on villagers' land use. In 1870, the Dutch declared all forest lands to be 'domain' lands owned by the colonial state.[15] Repeated attempts to extend this 'domain' concept to the Outer Islands were, however, resisted by colonial lawyers of the Leiden school and only a few areas outside Java were ever administered as 'domain' by the colonial state.[16]

The annexation of land and forest on such a scale in Java, which is home to nearly one third of Indonesia's population, could not come about without major social repercussions, resistance and repression. Laws, detailed regulations and punishment regimes proliferated, while methods for controlling peasant labour in the forest industries became more involuted.[17] From the mid-1870s onwards, the Dutch began to experiment with the *taungya* system, that was being applied by the British in Burma to quell tribal rebellions against timber exploitation there.[18] Under this system,

---

[12] FWI,WRI and GFW 2002:23.

[13] All these weaknesses were already clear in the 1860s when scientific forestry was first applied outside Europe – in Burma (Bryant 1997).

[14] Peluso 1992:45.

[15] Peluso 1992; Poffenberger 2000.

[16] Holleman 1981; Hooker 1978.

[17] Peluso 1992.

[18] Bryant 1997.

referred to as *tumpang sari* in Javanese, peasants were permitted to interplant their crops between teak saplings for a couple of years, until the saplings grew too tall and shaded out the crops. By the 1920s, over 94% of teak on Java was being planted using this system and the pattern has continued to the present day.[19] Today some 800,000 hectares of Java are under teak plantations. The people of the associated forest villages make a living through mixed economies in which *tumpang sari* plays a part but these are only a small proportion of the estimated 21 million people living in the 6000 forest villages that occupy the 23% of Java designated as forest land.[20]

Apart from officially approved forest clearance for some large-scale plantation schemes, mainly of rubber in the 1920s and 1930s on Sumatra, forest policy had little net impact on the forests of the 'Outer Islands' during the colonial period. However, following independence and with the development of new mechanized logging techniques in the 1960s, pressure on forests intensified. To regularize an at first chaotic exploitation of the forests by senior military officials, in 1967 the Government passed the Basic Forestry Law. This asserted the government's right to control and allocate exploitation rights in all almost all forest lands, while interpreting the customary rights of forest-dwellers as very weak usufruct privileges to non-timber forest products.[21]

Although regulations were passed that were meant to mitigate impacts on local communities and regulate the form of extraction, few of these rules were applied. Hundreds of very large logging concessions were handed out throughout the archipelago, starting with Sumatra and then progressing through Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Nusatenggara, the Moluccas and finally West Papua. Bizarrely, despite clear evidence that most of this extraction was being carried out in highly destructive ways, international agencies such as the FAO, ITTO, World Bank and IUCN lent their support to the promotion of this model of forestry. They presumed that technical improvements in forestry practice would somehow hold in check problems that in fact derived from the political economy of logging.[22] DfID was to try this same approach in the 1990s, but was eventually forced to admit failure.[23] By contrast, from 1987 onwards, Indonesian NGOs, such as SKEPHI, in alliance with other South East Asian NGOs, began calling for a regional moratorium on logging.[24]

Ignoring these critics, international agencies, such as DfID, GTZ and the World Bank also invested heavily in promoting a technocratic process of zoning Indonesia's forests. As ICRAF researchers have commented:

> *In the early 1980s, in what could be considered one of the largest land grabs in history, the government implemented a forest zonation system that classified most of the Outer Islands as forestlands. Seventy-eight percent of Indonesia, or more than 140 million hectares were placed under the responsibility of the Department of Forestry and Estate Crops. This included over 90% of the outer islands. Estimates place as many as 65 million people living within these areas. According to the Department of*

---

[19] Peluso 1992:63-64.
[20] Poffenberger 1990:220.
[21] Barber and Churchill 1987.
[22] Colchester 1990; Colchester and Lohmann 1990; Dauvergne 1997, 2001.
[23] DfID 1999.
[24] WRM 1989.

> *Forestry, the creation of the State forest zone nullified local <u>Adat</u> rights, making thousands of communities invisible to the forest management planning process and squatters on their ancestral lands. As a result, logging concessions, timber plantations, protected areas, and government-sponsored migration schemes have been directly overlaid on millions of hectares of community lands, causing widespread conflict. Yet, in fact for many local people, traditional law, or <u>hukum Adat</u>, still governs natural resource management practices.*[25]

The justification of this zoning was to 'rationalise' forest use. Forests were thus mapped and categorised first broadly into 'protection forests', 'production forests' and 'conversion forests' and then into various sub-categories, depending largely on biological criteria with no reference to the livelihoods or land use systems of the resident peoples. Far from curbing forest loss, however, the process merely legitimated the government's approach, which was to ignore the existence and rights of forest dwellers, while promoting logging, transmigration and large-scale plantations on community lands. NGOs protested but were rebuffed.[26] Consultants' reports which flagged these same concerns were buried.[27]

In the 1990s, as forest resources began to deplete to the extent of threatening the supply base of a domestic timber processing industry that had built up rapidly following a log export ban imposed in the 1970s, government policy shifted to the promotion of timber estates. Theoretically these were to be established on already degraded forestlands and were designed to lessen the pressure on natural forests, but the measures again ignored the interests of local communities. In practice, as NGOs predicted,[28] the majority of these plantations were established by first clear-cutting natural forests, and the planting, that was meant to follow, was never done. International capital flooded in to fund the huge pulp and paper ventures that sprang up, meaning that the demand for wood grew far faster than the trees in the new plantations.[29] By the end of the 1990s, Indonesia's forests, which foresters optimistically believed could yield some 22 million cubic metres of timber per year on a sustained yield basis – a calculation again made without regard for local livelihoods, were actually supplying more than three times that volume to sawmills, plywood factories and pulpmills. Today this problem of overcapacity remains unaddressed. It is conservatively estimated that 65% of this timber is being illegally extracted.[30] All this has been achieved by the systematic denial of the rights of local communities. By 2000, the NGO LATIN had documented some 20,000 disputes related to forests, protected areas and land.[31]

---

[25] Fay, Sirait and Kusworo 2000.
[26] Colchester 1986 a, b.
[27] Barber and Churchill 1987; Zerner 1990, 1992.
[28] DTE 1991.
[29] Carrere and Lohmann 1996 ; Barr 2002.
[30] DfID 1999; FWI, WRI, GFW 2002; DTE 2002.
[31] Cited in DTE 2002:19.

3. Community Forestry in Indonesia:

Community forestry in Indonesia thus faces profound challenges. A model of centrally-controlled 'scientific' forestry has favoured the promotion of large-scale logging and timber processing. This has generated employment for hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, a trade worth several billion dollars, a substantial proportion of Indonesia's foreign exchange and brought enormous wealth to a few hundred tycoons. In the context of a patrimonial political system dominated for over thirty years by a dictator,[32] this approach to forestry has also entrenched rent-seeking behaviours within the Forestry Department and contributed to Indonesia being considered one of the world's most corrupt countries. By the end of the 1990s, the forest department, which claimed jurisdiction over 70% of the country and nigh 90% of the 'outer islands', had expanded into a powerful institution with over 40,000 employees. Few of these have any training in community forestry. Those promoting an alternative approach to forestry, which gives priority to the needs, rights and livelihoods of local communities, thus face huge barriers, erected and defended by these vested interests in government, in parliament and in the private sector, all of whom benefit from the current regime. They also confront the mind-set of conventional 'scientific forestry' the training for which is largely science-based and deals only lightly with social issues.

A number of other legal and policy obstacles also stand in the way of community forestry, which also need to be mentioned.

3.1 Government Policies towards forest dwellers

As noted, *adat,* a term that can be loosely glossed as 'custom', is a central concept in Indonesia. Respect for custom is enshrined in the Constitution and rhetorically endorsed in the Basic Agrarian Law (see below). At the level of most rural communities, too, despite the imposition of repressive and uniform administrative systems since the 1960s,[33] customary systems of ordering life are still widely respected, if not always observed. Especially in forested areas, custom still largely determines the allocation of rights to land and other resources, and customary systems of natural resource management remain vigorous in some places.[34]

However, government policy towards forest-dwelling peoples has been determined largely by Javanese prejudices against shifting cultivators[35] and a national project of cultural assimilation. Under this programme run by the Department for Social Affairs and also in parallel by the Ministry of Forestry, communities referred to as 'isolated and alien tribes' are to be rapidly integrated into the process of national development. Central elements of the programme as applied in the 1970s-1990s included:

   o   Forced resettlement into centralized settlements
   o   Promotion of 'modern', 'developed' communities
   o   Fixed plot arable farming, preferably of rice

---

[32] Robison 1986.
[33] Budiardjo 1986; Lynch and Harwell 2002.
[34] Poffenberger 1990; 2000; Colfer and Dudley 1993; SEAFMN 1993.
[35] Dove 1985.

- o Elimination of shifting cultivation
- o Enforcement of monotheism and the destruction of 'animist' religious paraphenalia
- o Elimination of 'primitive thinking'
- o Elimination of collective dwellings and collective systems of owning or sharing goods and resources, including festivals.[36]

A slightly modified version of this programme continues today.[37]

3.2 Land Tenure

The 1945 Constitution entrusted Indonesia's natural resources to the State in line with the doctrines of State socialism. In 1960, the Government adopted the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) which, while recognizing custom as the basis for land ownership, strongly affirmed the principle of State control of all land. Central elements of the BAL and the regulations and procedures which it has entailed result in the following situation:

- o The State has the right to control all decisions about land in the national interest
- o Customary rights may be extinguished without compensation when a national interest is invoked
- o Individual land titling is promoted, though only 20% of land parcels have yet been registered
- o Collective tenures are treated as weak rights of usufruct
- o Collective tenures must give way to State-endorsed natural resource development programmes, including logging
- o No procedures exist for the delineation or registration of collective tenures.[38]

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, a period of legal and institutional reform has begun. The 1999 Human Rights Act provides for the protection and recognition of customary communities including collective tenure. A decision of the National Assembly (TAP MPR IX/2001) has recognized the flaws in the BAL and other laws relating to natural resources and has mandated the legislature to enact a comprehensive natural resources act which would *inter alia* reform tenurial laws. Meanwhile, authority over land and forest issues has passed to the district administrations and clauses in the new Local Government Act of 1999 – which has yet to be widely applied - provides a legal basis for the re-empowerment of *adat* institutions. A Decree from the Agrarian Ministry does now admit the possibility of collective usufructs and a handful of district level decrees, *Perda*, have begun to recognise a diverse range of community tenures. Many lawyers argue that a fundamental revision of the BAL is necessary before collective tenures can be legally secured.

The BAL however only applies to lands under the jurisdiction of the Agrarian Ministry. All forest lands are controlled by the Basic Forestry Laws (BFL) of 1967, revised in 1999, and are placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Forestry. The BFL provides even less recognition of custom than the BAL. The law:

---

[36] Persoon 1985; Colchester 1986a, 1986b; Li 1999.
[37] Badan 2000; DEPSOS 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002a. Interview with staff of DPKAT, 15 May 2002.
[38] Colchester 2001.

o Denies customary law communities a proprietary interest in forest land
o Treats customary rights as weak usufructs
o Subordinates them to the interests of concessionaires
o Criminalizes shifting cultivation, unauthorized cutting of trees and the occupation of forests.

Several studies carried out by the different aid agencies and for the Ministry of Forestry itself have repeatedly shown that the mechanisms designed to offset these problems by obliging concessionaires to share benefits with local communities have been unsuccessful and even damaging.[39]

The revised Forestry Act, which it had been widely hoped would recognise community rights in forests, disappointed many. Instead of recognising community forestry, the law instead opened the forests to logging cooperatives, while 'customary forests', mentioned for the first time, were defined as State forests in which there was no proprietary interest.

3.3 The Government's Community Forestry Programme

In the early 1990s, the Ministry of Forestry established a Directorate of Community Forestry, within the Directorate General of Land Rehabilitation and Social Forestry. Initial experiments with this approach were tried out on Java with mixed results. A Ministerial Decree (SK699/1998) allowed a more devolved approach to community forest management.[40] By 1999, the tiny bureau of only 50 staff had managed to grant forest management leases to communities to a total area of about 92,000 hectares, mainly to encourage them to rehabilitate degraded dry forests in Nusatenggara and West Timor. These leaseholds are referred to as *hutan kemasyarakatan* (HKM – community forests). However, the legislation underpinning this programme became invalid in 1999 with the passing of the new Forestry Act and Local Government Act, which devolved these decisions to the districts.

A revised decree (SK 31/2001) passed in 2001 allows district regents (*bupati*) to issue communities with usufructory leases to manage State forest lands unencumbered by any other rights or concessions for periods of up to 25 years (though shorter leases are often given in practice). These leases, which are subject to the elaboration of management plans satisfactory to the district level forestry bureaux, can be made definitive if the community incorporates as a cooperative, in accordance with the Cooperatives Act. Government statistics show that to date some 66,000 hectares have been parceled out to communities under the decree.[41]

However, in June 2002 the whole community forestry system was again placed in doubt subsequent to the passing of GR 34/2002, which revokes the authority of district level administrators and regents (*bupati*) to allocate timber cutting rights. A revised Ministerial Decree is now required to provide a system for the allocation of community forestry permits.

---

[39] Anyonge and Nugroho 1996; DfID 1999.
[40] DTE 2002:44.
[41] DBHK 2001: 34 (Table 3 as corrected in errata).

The Directorate admits that this leasehold system is only a first step towards the devolution of forest management to communities but argues that it is a process that requires support. In general, the Directorate notes, the Ministry of Forests questions even the existence of customary communities and is unsure whether customary systems of forest management are strong or rigorous enough to deal with the current pressures on forests from the market and competing interests. It notes that the Ministry of Forests currently does not have a system for recognizing customary rights, nor has it passed any regulations to make this possible. The subject is still under discussion within the Ministry.[42]

3.4 Decentralization

The weakness of a highly centralized forestry department remote from local realities has been apparent for some time. In 1992 the Spatial Use Management Law passed the authority to zone land and forests to the provinces although this contradicts both the 1967 and 1999 BFL.[43] However, following the fall of Suharto and in response to popular demands for reform, the government pushed through the Local Administration Act in 1999[44], which grants control of land use decisions to the administration and legislatures of Indonesia's 300+ districts (*kabupaten*). The 1999 BFL also gives *bupati* the authority to issue one-year 100 hectare logging licences. The results are chaotic. The logging licences are far too short to promote prudent forest management and the result is a chequerboard of small logging permits being handed out. Many of these have been placed on top of lands variously allocated by different jurisdictions to protected areas, existing or disputed logging concessions and customary community areas. In 2001, the then forestry minister even announced that a law was being prepared which would authorize districts to hand out full size logging concessions.[45] However, in a reversal of this policy in June 2002, the central government sought to bring a halt to the ensuing chaos by ending the right of *bupati* to hand out small-scale logging permits. Legal confusion now reigns about which piece of legislation has the full force of law. The tug-of-war for control of forests between the central Forestry Department and the districts has yet to reach a conclusion.

The implications of decentralization for community forestry are not yet clear. On the one hand, insofar as decision-making is brought nearer to the communities, they may be more able to push for land use decisions and rights allocations that accommodate their interests. On the other hand, district level forestry officials and bureaucracies, in general, have no experience or training in community forestry. It is not clear how the limited experience in community forestry developed in the central Directorate will or can be transferred to the regions.

---

[42] Interview with staff of Directorate of Community Forest Development, Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops, 15 May 2002.
[43] FWI, WRI, GFW 2002:62.
[44] Often referred to as the Regional Autonomy Law.
[45] FWI, WRI, GFW 2002:62; DTE 2002:30.

4. Local and National Community Forestry Networks:

Within Indonesia, a number of national actors have promoted community forestry with varying approaches and effectiveness. Among the most prominent have been the Ford Foundation, which has invested a substantial amount of its funding in social forestry and community forestry approaches over the past 20 years; the International Centre for Agroforestry Research (ICRAF); the development agencies notably GTZ, USAID and, more recently, DfID; the national NGOs and networks, which are reviewed below; and the international community forestry networks that are the main subject of this review.

This substantial investment of funds and effort has not yet had the effect of transforming forestry practice in Indonesia on any grand scale but has succeeded in raising awareness about community forestry alternatives. Although the political agendas of the individuals and institutions engaged in this process vary greatly, it is fair to say that perhaps the majority of those promoting community forestry have felt themselves to be part of a much larger social reform movement aimed at resisting and defeating the repressive, centralist policies of the Suharto dictatorship.

However, the scope for advertising such an agenda for change was until recently highly restricted. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the political space available to NGOs to criticize government was very limited and even reduced as NGOs began to proliferate in the early 1980s. The requirements for maintaining legal personality through registration as an NGO under the 1985 Law on Social Organisations (ORMAS) severely restricted NGO freedoms, giving the government power to disband NGOs whose activities were considered to be contrary to State interests. The majority of NGOs, those which absorbed the majority of overseas funding, chose to work within government programmes while promoting participatory approaches. Others, with a more Gandhian ethic, worked to 'empower' local communities without addressing policy issues. A third much smaller but more visible sector, only loosely linked to local actors, did also secure overseas grants but relied on the protection of more progressive elements within government to criticise government policies. They also used informal networking and the creation of 'forums' to front their more outspoken statements and critical findings.[46] However, only a handful of environmental and human rights activists felt brave enough to speak out in open opposition to the government. Some lived to regret their actions, while others disappeared or died. The press was likewise highly controlled.[47]

Rightly or wrongly, the aid agencies felt even less able to challenge government policy. Intergovernmental agencies and bilateral donors worked firmly within the framework of 'scientific forestry'. While most overseas voluntary sector agencies left their local NGO partners to secure agreement from their local regents (*bupati*) for them to receive project funding, others donors with a permanent office in the country such as the Ford Foundation, were constrained from funding any projects with NGOs without first getting approval from the Cabinet Secretariat.[48] To avoid trouble, most funders were extremely cautious about what they supported. Only in the final Suharto

---

[46] Eldridge 1990:510-513.
[47] Crouch 1978; Southwood and Flanagan 1983; Robison 1986; Thoolen 1987; and see *Tapol Bulletin* and *Down to Earth Newsletter*.
[48] Eldridge 1990.

years did press freedoms increase, NGOs become less restricted and open criticism of government laws and policies become possible and it was not until the fall of Suharto, in 1998, that it became possible for NGOs to have an overtly reformist agenda and gain mainstream development agency funds to further such approaches. For all these reasons, the movement to promote community forestry in Indonesia got off to a slow start.

In its early stages of promoting community forestry in Indonesia, therefore, the Ford Foundation worked mainly with the Indonesia forestry department and the Javanese forestry service with the aim of 'facilitating change in forestry bureaucracies'. The approach depended on having access to 'key insiders' and facilitating dialogue with local communities. Outside resource persons were brought in to promote new ideas, while service NGOs were brought in to help with training. The approach eschewed the involvement of advocacy NGOs which were felt to be too confrontational.[49] Forestry officials were trained to apply novel interview techniques, mapping and the use of aerial photography to ascertain the forest situation in pilot sites, in an attempt to shift perceptions about land use and local community needs and abilities.[50] Academics were encouraged to examine the prospects for the adoption of techniques similar to India's Joint Forest Management and Brazil's Extractive Reserves.[51] On Java, the Foundation sought to promote more participatory social forestry approaches with the aim of making forest managers more sensitive to local communities. The programme started well in its pilot phase but was then expanded by the government very rapidly more as an exercise in promoting reforestation cheaply than to secure benefits to farmers.[52] The results were thus disappointing, meanwhile little real progress was achieved on the 'Outer Islands'.[53] Ford responded by broadening its programme to support a greater diversity of actors.

In the 1990s, Ford explicitly adopted a multi-stakeholder approach to promoting forestry reform, while at the same time seeking to strengthen communities and stimulate accountable mechanisms of representation. Ford's strategy was to promote the devolution of forest management to communities within the current framework of State control of forests, while also supporting NGOs and networks more critical of the government's approach. It aimed to build up a 'critical mass' of positive examples of community forestry, by funding pilot projects, with the hope that this would then persuade the Forestry Department to mainstream community forest management. Training of forestry officials and NGO personnel in community forestry with RECOFTC inputs was part of this strategy. Networks were central to Ford's overall approach. The approach was criticized in the 1990s for not paying enough attention to tenurial issues, failing to link to social movements and being unduly cautious about what reforms should be supported. With the benefit of hindsight, it does seem true that a number of Ford's initiatives were overtaken by events.

---

[49] Poffenberger 1990:97-118.
[50] Fox 1990 in Poffenberger 1990: 119-133
[51] Peluso 1991a, 1991b.
[52] Peluso, Poffenberger and Seymour 1990 In Poffenberger 1990:220-236.
[53] Lynch and Talbott 1995:99.

4.1 FKKM

The Communication Forum on People's Forestry (FKKM) emerged in 1997 as an attempt by the Ford Foundation to create an inclusive forum which could stimulate dialogue among all the various 'stakeholders' concerned with community forestry. The Forum includes government officials, academics, NGOs, and the private sector. Links with community-based organizations were however weak. The aim of the Forum was to share information and examine the pros and cons of different forms of forest management in a 'professional' environment.

The context for the Forum changed rapidly, however, first with the Asian financial crisis and then Suharto's fall from power in 1998. During early 1998, FKKM members tried to lobby the World Bank and IMF to introduce conditionalities into their economic rescue package that would favour community forestry. The results were hugely disappointing. When Habibie and then Wahid took over the Presidency and announced a period of reform, expectations rose that a new Forestry Act could accommodate community forestry. FKKM was thus rapidly mobilized as a forestry reform think tank, a role which excited NGO and academic members but which placed government officials who were members of the Forum in an awkward situation. In practice if not in theory, FKKM became an NGO-dominated advocacy network, headed up by academics to give it respectability. The Forestry Act was, however, reformed in a way very much counter to the Forum's proposals and led to much demoralization among members.

The Forum was successful in spreading awareness about community forestry and stimulated academics to develop courses in community forestry in some universities.

With hindsight, FKKM members note that the Forum was weakened by its failure to adequately engage local community organizations. Notes one interviewee:

> *In developing a multi-stakeholder dialogue there is a high need to empower IPOs and even NGOs first, otherwise the network will be imbalanced and they will not share or the approach will not be locally rooted and State views will predominate. Many members of FKKM are not actually working in the field. So some members are not very experienced but look instead for a project-based approach. So you see the network is strongly influenced by its governance structure. In the first three years FKKM only developed as a discussion process. In 1999 they started lobbying. They played that role quite well: this was the peak for FKKM. Although they failed to get their ideas into the Forestry Law it was a good process. Good consultations did happen but since then people have been frustrated... The network was emotionally, psychologically tired – it was a set back for FKKM and it has not really regenerated since. It lost its focus. It now risks becoming project focused – with Ford funding – instead of being based on a social movement.*

Other members admit that the Forum's lack of strong links with the grassroots is a real problem and attempts are now underway to decentralize the Forum's functioning and reach out to the regions.

FKKM continues to function as a loose email network. It is complimented for being open to all and is used as a means of sharing advice and experiences. However, some field activists complain that the advice of many intellectuals and NGO members is excessively ideological. One interviewee working closely with landless farmers noted that when they asked for advice on how local migrants could best make use of HKM to secure land, they only got back polemic and objections from other network members – no practical advice. However, more recently, successes in securing community rights as HKM, as in the WATALA/ICRAF project in Sumberjaya in Lampung (Southern Sumatra) have been appreciated by other FKKM members as a breakthrough and FKKM has facilitated farmer to farmer sharing of this experience with other provinces.

Another interviewee suggests that because Ford's and other donors' funds for community forestry were not channeled through the Forum but given direct to the government, the Forum missed an opportunity of gaining financial leverage over the reform process and project implementation.

4.2 KpSHK

The Consortium for Supporting Community-based Forest System Management also got going in 1997 although it had evolved informally as a means of sharing experiences among a number of NGOs testing pilot projects in community forestry over the previous three years. The Consortium also enjoys Ford and other donor support. Emphasising the importance of an ecosystem, rather than timber centric, approach to community forestry, the network has opposed the HKM process and instead advocated a more radical reform which would value the importance of:

- Local knowledge
- Customary institutions
- Community control over forests
- Tenure reform

The Consortium brought together some 43 NGOs, but has few direct links with community organisations.[54] Recently the Consortium has been through a very healthy process of self-evaluation, which brought out a number of key issues.

Notes one member self-critically:

> *We find it hard to reach the local level. We do not have a direct relation with the locals but try to link through the local NGOs. It turns out that the NGOs are [themselves] only partially linked to the locals. SHK is strongly opposed to the government's approach to community forestry (HKM) but not all locals share this view… we find we cannot deal directly with the locals through the consortium.*

Indeed KpSHK notes that its confrontational approach was itself a problem.

---

[54] An obvious exception was the SHK network in East Kalimantan which worked closely with communities in conflict with oil palm plantations and HTI concessionaires.

> *Sometimes the NGOs are in conflict with the government which keeps the local peoples away from the NGOs. People stay away from trouble. Some NGOs don't want to even **sit** with the government.*

Some KpSHK members are now also more openly admitting that a single solution approach to community forestry is probably inappropriate. While communities where customary law remains strong may be suited to an 'SHK' approach, since they have rich local traditions of forest management and vibrant customary institutions, migrant farmers and displaced peasants may have no history of forest management at all. For such communities the HKM approach, which implies government oversight and control of many decisions, may be the appropriate first step.

4.3 JKPP

During the mid-1990s, a vigorous NGO movement for the mapping of community land claims and land use systems established itself in Indonesia. These ideas and techniques were introduced into Indonesia, in large part, thanks to an active but unstructured international network of mappers who had promoted similar approaches in Thailand, the Philippines and Latin America, but also prior to that in Canada and the USA.

With Ford Foundation support, the mappers in Indonesia were able to form a network for participatory community mapping (JKPP), which has helped share the lessons and experiences quite widely but unevenly across the archipelago. Participatory mapping has proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of community activists and has allowed them to dialogue with NGOs, local government and the private sector to secure some measure of recognition of their customary rights – for example in spatial planning (as in West Kalimantan), for a special decree recognizing *damar* forests (as in Krui in Lampung), for the appropriate zoning and redelineation of village land and protected areas (as in Kayan Mentarang in East Kalimantan).[55] Maps have strengthened communities' resolve to press for a recognition of collective rights to their lands, which may yet provide a useful basis for community forestry once government policies, nationally and locally, provide mechanisms for recognition.[56]

4.4 AMAN

In 1999, community activists held a historic congress in Jakarta establishing the *Alianzi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (AMAN – the alliance of peoples, governed by custom, of the archipelago). Claiming to represent some 60-120 million people, who live in communities where custom is still respected, the Congress called for the recognition of community rights. AMAN issued the challenge to the reformists for a change in policy towards the country's marginalized communities. *'We will not recognise the State unless the State recognizes us.'* Although land reform and the

---

[55] Colchester 2000; Eghenter 2000; Alcorn and Royo 2000.
[56] Government resistance to mapping has however also grown. For example, in Manis Mata in East Kalimantan the government blames NGO-promoted mapping for stirring up resistance to imposed forestry projects and claims that only the government has the authority to make maps.

recognition of their right to self-governance are their central demands, AMAN is also demanding the reform of forestry and land tenure laws to ensure a restitution of customary rights to own, control and manage natural resources including forests as part of this demand for recognition.

Since its establishment, AMAN has been effective at raising its profile nationally and internationally. The existence of AMAN has obliged policy analysts and aid agencies to realize that the systematic exclusion of these millions of people from having secure rights is a central problem that has to be confronted if 'sustainable forest management' is to be achieved.

AMAN as a movement has, however, had greater problems in building up its institutional capacity to meet the expectations of its members and deal with incessant demands for its views and for information from other NGOs, development agencies and government bodies. Pulled in so many directions at once, AMAN has found it hard to consolidate as well as build regional capacity and engage in national policy dialogue. However, in the author's view, based on community level workshops carried out with AMAN and ICRAF in 2000, many of the base organizations have a far greater capacity to manage forests and press for institutional reforms than many Jakarta-based NGOs admit.

4.5 The network challenge within Indonesia:

As many interviewees repeatedly pointed out in this review, the main challenge that networkers face in Indonesia is to establish real two-way links with the communities. As one interviewee noted:

> *Networks in Indonesia are basically email-based which limits their connections to the grassroots. It is difficult to expect farmers to tap into these resources. The NGOs thus act as intermediaries. This is not bad in itself. However, if networks are meant to help farmers they should be structured in a way that suits farmers. The media used need to be chosen accordingly. Helping grassroots people to organize and represent themselves should be the key focus. What is the most accessible means of communication that helps them network farmer to farmer? This is the question that donors should ask. Public radio is an interesting medium that should be looked at.*

The local AFN contact expressed a similar view, as noted in the quote on the cover. Notes another exasperated funder:

> *The networks contain too many of the same people all meeting together but not really active on the ground. They generate endless minutes and proceedings. There are too many NGOs with laptops and administrative budgets.*

Yet another interviewee makes a similar point:

> *The challenge is to bring the policy discussions to the field. There is a gap between the locals and the national NGOs. Middle class NGOs don't link to the farmer class. They use the wrong technology. They need to use more popular media not email etc but the radio. Also, Indonesia had a very long experience of the <u>Orde Baru</u> which suppressed the local capacity to mobilize and education is highly limited. Traditional institutions have almost been finished off – well, maybe not in all areas.*

A recent evaluation of the networks carried out for the Ford Foundation came to the following conclusions:

- Most of the networks are donor driven and donor initiated
- A network is only as good as its members
- Internal governance of networks is a major issue
- Networks face a dilemma between benign dictatorship and consultativeness
- Many suffer structural problems and have never questioned the links between structure, participation and accountability
- Indonesian customary decision-making through consensus-building (*musyarawah*) helps build joint visions but often allows individuals to dominate networks.

Another lessons that has come out of the national experience is that the community forestry movement should now be giving much greater attention to tenurial reform. The main thing that the communities are demanding is security. Indeed a network of networks has coalesced around this issue in the form of a working group pushing for a law that would to put into effect the National Assembly resolution that instructs the legislature to radically reform land and forest tenure laws and institute an integrated procedure for natural resource management (TAP MPR IX). This network has brought together the community forestry activists with the human rights and social justice organizations as well as AMAN and NGOs pressing for land reform like KPA and the RACA Institute.

Some World Bank staff are wary of such root-and-branch legal reform, fearing that this will merely spawn more chaos, given the institutional weakness in existing national and local government institutions. On the other hand, the clear conclusion that the World Bank derives from its Land Administration Project (1996-1999) is that tenure reform is vital both for effective development and to secure the rights of forest based communities.[57]

On the government side, a major challenge now comes from the decentralization process. As one forestry official notes:

> *There is low awareness at the <u>kabupaten</u> level institutions about Community Forestry. This is because in the past the forests were managed in a highly centralized way. Now under the autonomy laws the local institutions at the <u>kabupaten</u> level are not ready to take on their responsibilities. They are still fighting the central government authority.*

---

[57] Wallace, Parlingdungan and Hutagalung 1997; Wright 1999.

> *This is a transitional problem. Communication between the two is only just beginning to be restored. This needs help and foresters need retraining – their formal training taught them little about the social aspects.*

A number of interviewees expressed the view that a general change in NGO tactics is now required in response to decentralization. In the past, Indonesian NGOs have specialized and networked along sectoral lands, focusing on issues like human rights, mining, indigenous peoples, participatory mapping, land rights, oil palm, logging and community forestry. This may have been appropriate given the centralized and highly sectoral nature of government decision-making over the past 50 years. However, they argue, if the regional autonomy laws take effect, then NGOs and social movements would do better to develop regional not sectoral networks, helping them to focus their energies on promoting cross-sectoral reforms at the provincial and kabupaten level, instead of focusing their efforts on national legal reform. The practicality of this suggestion has yet to be tested.[58]

5. International Community Forestry Networks in Indonesia:

Given Indonesia's prominence as the world's fourth most populous country, its once extensive forests, its rich biodiversity and its many social justice and development challenges, not surprisingly most of the main international community forestry networks have been active in Indonesia in one way or another.

RECOFTC, which has had a long engagement in the country ever since its founding, has had some 200 Indonesians pass through its courses, from government agencies, the private sector and from NGOs. Many of the main actors now engaged in community forestry have trained with RECOFTC and a large proportion got their first exposure to community forestry principles through this experience. All the other networks surveyed including IUCN-CIFM, FTPP, AFN, WRM, RDFN and FSC-CFWG have carried out activities in Indonesia or have local counterparts and focal points there.

Notwithstanding the long term engagement of these networks in the country, the strong impression I was given in this survey is that, **in general**, international networks are somewhat resented and suspect to many community forestry activists. In part this is because the networks are seen as Northern dominated, intent on imposing their ideas and agendas on Indonesian partners regardless of their local suitability. Because they tend to be relatively well resourced and highly trained, international networkers can dominate discussions and use their budgets to determine local activities. Network activities can then get driven by the agenda of international players. However, as one participant in the workshop commented:

> *It is not a black and white situation. The problem is the lack of trust between local partners and international organizations. Some are seen as a continuation of transnational corporations.*

---

[58] Moves in this direction can be seen in Sanggau (West Kalimantan) and Kutai Barat (East Kalimantan) and in mid-Sulawesi in the mountainous area on the borders of Central, South and South-East Sulawesi.

Another remarked:

> *Many of these actors are really seeking funding for projects from donors rather than really being based on the aspirations of the local communities. Only a few (networks) act as amplifiers for the local voice.*

Many international networkers are also resented because they seem indifferent to the fact that their own countries are in many ways equally responsible for forest destruction and the problems in Indonesia, not just in terms of destructive foreign investment but also in terms of inappropriate aid. The fact that Northern countries are just as bad as many Southern ones in their failure to ratify or adhere to international human rights, trade and environment agreements, was mentioned as a source of indignation in interviews. These North-South tensions are real problems which networks often fail to address.

These problems are exacerbated by language difficulties. In general, international networks do not have staff that speak Bahasa Indonesia well, while few local actors speak English. Communications are thus channeled through the Indonesian educated elite, mainly living in Jakarta. As noted, in the previous section, however, even these national level players have problems networking with the local communities. As a result, the connections between the international networks and local communities are highly attenuated. In addition, local actors, who may speak English poorly or not at all, easily feel overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of information coming from outside the country.

The table (below) compiles, in a succinct way, all the comments noted in the interviews and workshops about the specific networks. No attempt has been made to validate or corroborate these personal opinions and they are offered here only as food for thought: they are not the judgments of the author.

The view was expressed that the activities of the international networks and their advocacy have given confidence to the local NGOs to deal and dialogue with the government. The networks have imported knowledge, competence and insights which have helped promote policy change in favour of community forestry. The networks have also helped local actors to access funds. One interviewee questioned whether even the government's HKM programme would have happened without these inputs and the support of international advocacy.

International policy reform has had only a limited impact on national policy change but local actors have been able to use this discourse and these advances to break open political space nationally. For example, using the international critique of the Tropical Forestry Action Plan in the late 1980s and subsequent donor commitments to reform, local NGOs like WALHI and SKEPHI were able to insist on participation in national policy dialogues when the World Bank was developing a Forest Sector programme in the early 1990s. The same is now possible again in the context of discussions about the national forestry programme modeled on the IPF/IFF formulations.

Network	Pros	Cons
FKKM	Inclusive and involves all stakeholders.	Advocacy approach alienated government members. No grassroots links. Not well organized.
KpSHK	Developed good database. Unified vision of community forestry.	Too ideological (doctrinaire). Not well connected to communities.
JKPP	Effective information sharing. Powerful tool developed.	'Magic bullet' belief. Some of the more sophisticated technologies distance NGO technicians from community mappers.
AMAN	Mobilisation of community-based organizations.	Lack of capacity and communication. Overstretched.
SHK-WALHI	Was very active.	Now defunct
FAO-FTPP	Not known as a network but publications well known and valued. Especially useful in '80s-'90s when issue was new. Introduced the key concepts. Good magazine. Useful short articles.	Focus on reforestation not customary CF. Is FAO the right actor? Hard to make relevant to local level.
RECOFTC	Well known. Important training of government, parastatal and NGO people. Strong alumni effect. Gave stimulus to creation of FKKM. Regional exchange programme valuable. Very responsive to local partners. Good newsletter	Currently being transformed. Concern about business approach. Local contacts not adequately participatory. Weak alumni networking. Too donor driven: courses all booked up. Weak on tenure. Not enough policy work – too technical. Not training at community level.
IUCN-CIFM	Useful survey (with AFN). Very good publication with good analysis.	Focal point has not shared experience nationally. Documents not well disseminated. At IPF was not close to IPOs and NGOs in UC process. Nationally not linked to local voice. Too abstract. Very expensive. No field programme.
FSC	Linked to LEI and FKKM. Prompted LEI to establish CBFM working group.	Only four FSC members in Indonesia. Not well known.
AFN	Useful studies (for IUCN). Useful for higher level networks and national advocacy. Good at responding to email. Good exchange between Java and Philippines.	Suffered personnel conflicts. Was too academic. Research for research's sake. Just re-started. Limited funding. Not yet known by government. Is it a network or a club? Not on outer islands.
RDFN	Publications useful. Wonderful directory. Good writing. Addresses seminal issues.	Not a two-way network but an information service. Information not made locally relevant. Not well known.
WRM	A powerful network. Raises local issues internationally. Brings out local voice. Good support for policy reform and local campaigns. Radical analysis: good books. Consultative local contact. Lightweight network with low bureaucracy : a model for local network (JAPHAMA). Has feedback mechanism. Newsletter valued, forwarded and translated.	Local contacts keep low profile (as WRM). Not easy to link up with. Not known by government or by many NGOs. Too focused on critique of the 'structural deforestation', needs to support alternatives more. Key personalities dominant.
Down to Earth	Useful support. Valued publications. Supports local campaigns.	Lack of capacity for long term partnerships. Rushed visits.
CICAFOC	Inspirational. Grassroots based. Good focus on tenure.	Not active in Indonesia.

One interviewee noted that although the Indonesian government has moved very sluggishly to implement even binding international agreements, such as the CBD, let alone non-binding ones like Agenda 21, the very fact that the government got exposed to ideas like participation, community forestry, indigenous peoples' knowledge and the importance of land tenure at international fora has been of some help at the national level.

> *It provides more space for the national activists to speak out, for example at the meetings of Consultative Group on Indonesia (an aid agency forum).*

Many of these conceptual advances at the level of international law or policy were deployed by those NGOs whose successful lobbying of the Upper House resulted in the passing of TAP MPR IX. For example the ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, though not yet ratified by Indonesia, is frequently invoked by Indonesia's indigenous peoples (*masyarakat adat*) and even DEPSOS officials are now starting to take it into account.

> *For NGOs this stuff does provide good ammunition and was helpful to us in rearticulating our demands. NGOs have used internationally recognized principles and arguments to press for national policy reform... However, from civil society's point of view, the substance that is developing at the international level, while quite useful, is very slow in effecting national change.*

6. Lessons Learned:

During the workshop and the interviews, the strongest point that came across, repeatedly, is the lack of articulation between the international networks and the local communities. As one interviewee noted:

> *The problem is that the international networks do not go to the grassroots to form their strategies. They need to have community level workshops to orientate them so they have good strategies with regard to how they will interfere with peoples' life systems.*

Another stated:

> *All the networks should frankly admit that what they are doing is not effective compared to the rapid process of destruction. We need to find new brilliant ways to promote our cause. In terms of finding strategic ways, the networks need to go back to the national and district level to link to the peoples' networks and learn (about) the real issues they are facing. If the networks rely on an old statement of the problems then they are far away from the solutions.*

Noted another:

> *International networks need to invest more in building up local network capacity. The institutional costs of networking are not adequately assessed and so much work is <u>ad hoc</u>.*

Some networks were also criticized for being apparently closed and dominated by a few key individuals. If the networks are to be innovative and adapt to changing circumstances new mechanisms are needed to provide scope for newcomers.

Some of the networks, of course, have prioritized support for local campaigns. The WRM and organizations like the US-based Rainforest Action Network, Environmental Defense and UK-based Down to Earth – the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia were explicitly mentioned in this regard. But this brings up other problems. As one interviewee noted:

> *International support for campaigns is highly valued but (there is a) need for building up local capacity because campaigns place a burden on local NGOs which may not be sustainable.*

But just how should international networks link better to local communities? This question was also debated in interviews and workshops. Part of the problem, it was suggested, lies in the way national counterparts and focal points are identified. If focal points are not themselves active networkers then they will act as bottlenecks that restrict communications between the local communities and the international networks they are part of. It was also noted that, in general, national members of networks are too passive – waiting to receive information but not taking opportunities to share information or develop strategies. Instead, international networks should try to connect direct to the NGOs active at the field level and should link with institutions and networks that have shown real local level commitment, instead of trying to communicate through individuals.

Problems in the national networks were also recognized as a large part of the problem (as noted in the section 4 of this report). One interviewee commented on the difficulties that community members have involving themselves at the national level:

> *There is an illusion of equal partnership in national meetings. They (the networks) should prioritise participation and the use of non-technical language to facilitate IPOs' and local community engagement. Otherwise NGOs, like companies, are overwhelming. Preparatory meetings are needed to get the locals up to speed. (Otherwise) people's voices get excluded – they don't have an understanding of this (language).*

During the workshop, in particular, interviewees emphasized the obstacles to communications between the international networks and national and local actors. While some value the information in email circulars, newsletters, reports and books, many others are critical. Noted one participant:

> *Verbal information and workshops, discussions and meetings, are a better way of communicating than email and newsletters, books and*

papers. The weakness of the international networks is information management.

Asked to note what they felt were key gaps in networks strategies, workshop participants noted**:**

- Language used is not understood
- Information is too technical and exclusive
- Focal points are not well advertised or made known
- Focal points don't provide information about the activities they undertake
- Information is not relevant to the local context
- Dissemination of information is defective and slow

The majority of those interviewed favoured simplifying communications – through using public radio and comic books for example and through using videos in place of reports. Only one interviewee mentioned the potential of electronic conferencing, most apparently favouring simpler technologies. As far as documents were concerned participants recommended that they should have:

- Shorter summaries
- Be more real and interesting
- Make abstract issues more concrete
- Use local languages

Few interviewees or workshop participants knew enough about the governance structures of the international networks to make concrete suggestions as to how they could be improved. One interviewee had the firm view that:

The issue is accountability. Many networks are set up by a limited number of key actors working at the international level and they are exclusive and not well linked. The need is for social accountability… The key is who makes decisions – the people in the North or the South. Network coordinators need to consult local partners and not make unilateral decisions.

On the other hand, it was noted that informal networks are often much more effective than those with formalised governance and accountability structures. In general, noted one interviewee, once the networks become well structured they become less active and their campaigns become less effective. According to this view, networks should avoid becoming top-heavy and try to maintain a lightweight structure and simple style of work, open to inputs by local voices, with stronger links to local communities and indigenous peoples.

Interviewees were however very diverse in what they though the international networks should prioritise. A number noted that more work on land tenure and policy reform should be a priority. More campaigns in support of local struggles were stressed by others. While another emphasized the growing need for technical inputs on indigenous indigenous silviculture and natural resource management skills. Further training of local government foresters was also demanded. Something for everyone!

7. Challenges and Prospects:

Community forestry is at a critical juncture in Indonesia. The basic concepts of community forestry, of course, have been practiced in the country for thousands of years but the notion that these customary approaches to forest management are in any way equivalent to western 'scientific forestry' has been introduced only quite recently and is still resisted by mainstream foresters. National networks, in an uneasy relation with their international partners, are only tenuously connected to the grassroots. Their long term relevance to local change is still in doubt.

Just which way community forestry now develops in Indonesia depends above all on whether authority over forests is or is not devolved to the provinces and districts. Until this is clearer, the strategies and tactics that should be adopted by the national networks are very hard to guess at.

For international networks, the lessons are clearer. To be more effective they need to attend more to the local realities, adopt agile working methods that give more control to local partners, and styles of communications tailored to suit local needs. Easier said than done.

Bibliography:
Alcorn J & Royo N (eds), 2000,
Indigenous Social Movements and Ecological Resilience, a PeFoR Discussion Paper,
BSP-Kemala.

Aliadi, A. et. al. (eds), 1999,
Kembalikan Hutan Kepada. Rakyat. Penerbit Pustaka Latin, Bogor.

Andasputra, N. & Vincentius, J. (eds), 1995,
Mencermati Dayak Kanayatin. Institute of Dayakology Research and Development,
Pontianak.

Anderson, Benedict, 1983,
Imagined Communities. Verso, London.

Anyonge, Christine Holding and Yuli Nugroho, 1996,
*Rural Populations Living Within Logging Concessions in Indonesia: a review of
social development programmes and a case study from South Kalimantan.* Ministry of
Forestry and ENSO Forest Development Oy Ltd, Jakarta.

Atok, K. et al. (eds)
1998 *Peran Masyarakat Dalam. Tata Ruang.* Pembinaan Pengelolaan Sumbar Daya
Alam Kemasyarakatan, Pebruari.

Badan, 2000,
Panduan Umum: Pengembangan Kesejahteraan Sosial Komunitas Adat Terpencil.
DPKAT, Badan Kesejahteraan Sosial Nasional, Jakarta.

Barber, C. V., 1999,
The Case Study of Indonesia. World Resources Institute, Washington.

Barber, Charles V. and Gregory Churchill, 1987,

Land Policy in Irian Jaya: Issues and Strategies. Government of Indonesia and
UNDP / IBRD project INS/83/013.

Barber, Charles, Nels Johnson and Emmy Hafild, 1994,

*Breaking the Logjam: obstacles to forest policy reform in Indonesia and the United
States.* World Resources Institute, Washington DC.

Barr C, 2002,
*Banking on Sustainability: Structural Adjustment and Forestry Reform in Post-
Suharto Indonesia*, WWF/CIFOR.

Bryant, Richard, 1997,
The Political Ecology of Forestry in Burma: 1824-1994. University of Hawaii Press,
Honolulu.

Budiardjo, Carmel and Liem Soei Liong, 1988,
West Papua: the obliteration of a people. Tapol, London. Revised edition.

Budiman, Arief (ed.), 1990,
State and Civil Society in Indonesia. Monash University, Victoria.

Burns, Peter, 1989,
The Myth of Adat. *Journal of Legal Pluralism* 28:1-127.

1999
The Leiden Legacy: Concepts of Law in Indonesia. PT Pradnya Paramita, Jakarta.

Carrere, Ricardo and Larry Lohmann, 1996,
Pulping the South: Industrial Tree Plantations and the World Paper Economy. Zed
Book, London.

Chidley, Liz, 2002,
Forests, People and Rights. Down to Earth - the International Campaign for Ecological
Justice in Indonesia, London.

Colchester, Marcus, 1986a,
Unity and Diversity: Indonesian policy towards tribal peoples. *The Ecologist* 16
(2/3):89-98

1986b,
The Struggle for Land: tribal peoples in the face of the Transmigration Programme. *The
Ecologist* 16 (2/3):99-110

1990, The International Tropical Timber Organisation: kill or cure for the rainforests ?
The Ecologist 20(4):166-173.

2000, Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity Conservation: Sector Review for the
Biodiversity Support Program:Global Overview and South and South East Asia
Review. *Report for Biodiversity Support Program, Washington DC.*

2001, *Survey of Indigenous Land Tenure.* Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome.

Colchester M, Lohmann L, 1990,
The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: What Progress ?, World Rainforest Movement,
Penang, Malaysia. Two editions.

Colfer, Carol J. Pierce,1995,
*Beyond Slash and Burn: Building on Indigenous Management of Borneo's Tropical
Rainforests.* New York Botanic Garden, New York.

Colfer, Carol J. Pierce, with Richard Dudley, 1997,
*Shifting Cultivators of Indonesia: Marauders or Managers of the Forest? Rice
Production and Forest Use Among the Uma' Jalan of East Kalimantan.* FAO, Rome.

Colfer, Carol J. Pierce and Byron,Yvonne (eds.), 2001,
People Managing Forests: the links between Human Well-being and Sustainability.
Resources for the Future and CIFOR, Washington DC and Bogor.

Colfer C & Resosudarmo (eds), 2001,
Which Way Forward? Forests, Policy and People in Indonesia, John Hopkins
University Press

Crouch, Harold, 1978,
The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Dauvergne, Peter, 1997,
Shadows in the Forests: Japan and the Tropical Timber Trade in South East Asia. MIT
Press, Los Angeles.

2001 *Loggers and Degradation in the Asia-Pacific: Corporations and Environmental
Management.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

DBHK
2001   *Perkemnagun Hutan Kemasyarakatan: sampai dengan Mei 2001.* Departmen
Kehutanan, Direktorat Jenderal Rehabilitasi Lahan Dan Perhutanan Sosial, Direktorat
Bina Hutan Kemasyarakatan, Jakarta.

de Beere, Jenne and Melanie McDermott
1989   *The Economic Value on Non-Timber Forest Products in South-East Asia.*
IUCN(Netherlands), Amsterdam.

DEPHUT
2001   *Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan Republik Indonesia: Tentang Penyelenggaraan
Hutan Kemasyarakatan. Nomor 31 Tahun 2001.* Departemen Kenhutanan, Jakarta.

DEPSOS
2001a *Pedoman Umum Pelaksanaan Pemetaan Sosial Komunitas Adat Terpencil.*
DPKAT, DEPSOS, Jakarta.

2001b *Pedoman Umum Pengukuran Indikator Kinerja Keberhasilan Program
Pemberdayaan Komunitas Adat Terpencil.* DPKAT, DEPSOS, Jakarta.

2001c *Standardisasi Monitoring dan EvaluasiKebijaksanaan Komunitas Adat
Terpencil.* DPKAT, DEPSOS, Jakarta.

2002a *Secercah Mentari Pagi.* DPKAT, DEPSOS, Jakarta.

2002b *Pedoman Teknis Usaha Perlindungan Komunitas Adat Terpencil.* DPKAT,
DEPSOS, Jakarta (draft ms).

DfID
1999   *Indonesia: Towards Sustainable Forest Management*, Final Report of the
Senior Management Advisory Team and the Provincial Level Forest Management

Project, 2 vols, Department for International Development (UK) and Department of Forestry, Jakarta.

Didik Suharjito, 1999
Hak Hak Penguasaan Atas Hutan di Indonesia. Fakultas Kehutanaan Institut Pertanian, Bogor.

Didik Suharjito, 2000
Hutan Rakyat di Jawa Peranya dalam Perekonoima Desa. Fakultas Kehutanaan Institut Pertanian, Bogor.

Didik Suharjito and Dudung Darusman, 1998,
Kehutanan Masyrakat: Beragan Pola Partisipasi Masyarakat dalam Pengeloloaan Hutan. Fakultas Kehutanaan Institute Pertanian, Bogor

Djuweng, S. et al. (eds), 1998,
Kalimantan. The Dayak of Kalimantan Who are They? *The Dayak: Culture, Nature and Peoples.* Vol.1, May 1998.

Djuweng, S., 1997,
The Dominant Paradigm and the Cost of Development. Some implications for Indonesia. Institute of Dayakology Research and Development, Pontianak.

1997   *Indigenous Peoples and Land-Use Policy in Indonesia. A Dayak Showcase.* Institute of Dayakology Research and Development, Pontianak.

Dove, Michael R., 1985,
The Agroecological Mythology of the Javanese and the Political Economy of Indonesia. *Indonesia* 39:1-30.

DTE, 1991,
Pulping the Rainforest. Down to Earth - the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia, London.

1999   Indonesia's Indigenous Peoples Form New Alliance. *Down to Earth Bulletin,* Special Issue, October 1999. Down to Earth - the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia, London.

2001   *Certification in Indonesia: a briefing.* Down to Earth - the International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia, London.

Eghenter, Cristina, 2000,
Mapping Peoples' Forests: the role of mapping in planning community-based management of conservation areas in Indonesia. PeFoR Discussion Paper, Biodiversity Support Program, Washington DC.

Eldridge, Philip, 1990,
NGOs and the State in Indonesia. In: Arief Budiman (Ed.), *State and Civil Society in Indonesia,* Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton:503-536.

Fay, Chip, Martua Sirait and Ahmad Kusworo, 2000,
Getting the Boundaries Right: Indonesia's Urgent Need to Redefine its Forest Estate.
International Centre for Reseacrh in Agro-Forestry, Bogor.

Florus, P., 1998,
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat. Institute of Dayakology Research and Development
(IDRD), Pontianak.

FWI, WRI, GFW, 2002,
The State of the Forest: Indonesia. Forest Watch Indonesia, World Resources Institute
and Global Forest Watch, Bogor and Washington.

Hasann, Simon, San Afri Awang, Danie W Mungorro, Yuli Nugroho, 1998
Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Hutan Nasional. Fakultas Kehutanaan Institut Pertanian
dan FKKM, Yogyakarta.

Haryanto, I. (ed.), 1998,
Kehutanan Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Reformasi Tanpa Perubahan. Penerbit Pustaka
Latin, Bogor.

Holleman, J.F. (ed.), 1981,

Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law. Konninklijk Institut Voor Taal-, Land- en
Volkekunde, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.

Hooker, M.B., 1978,
Adat Law in Modern Indonesia. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur.

Juwono, P. S. H., 1998,
Ketika Nelayan Harus Sandar Dayung. Studi Nelayan Miskin di Desa Kirdowono.
KONPHALINDO, Jakarta.

KPPH, 2001,
*Medampingi Masyarakat Kamp;ung MenjalaiProses Belajar Bersama dalam
Pengelolaan Hutan.* Gabungan KPPH, P3AE, Jakarta.

Kahin, Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin, 1995,

*Subversion as Foreign Policy: the Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in
Indonesia.* The New Press, New York.

Lev, Daniel S, 2000,
Legal Evolution and Political Authority in Indonesia: selected essays. Kluwer Law
International, The Hague.

Lynch, O. J. & Talbott, K., 1995,
*Balancing Acts: Community-Based Forest Management and National Law in Asia
and the Pacific.* World Resources Institute, Baltimore.

Lynch, O and Emily Harwell, 2002,
Whose Natural Resources? Whose Common Good? Towards a New Paradigm of Environmental Justice and the National Interest in Indonesia. ELSAM, Jakarta.

Munggoro, D. W. et al., 1998,
Intervensi Perhutanan Sosial. Lembaga Alam Tropica Indonesia, Bogor.

Munggoro, D. W. et al., 1999,
Menggugat Ekspansi Industri Pertambangan di Indonesia LATIN, Bogor.

Murray Li, T. (ed.), 1999,
Transforming the Indonesian Uplands. Marginality, Power and Production. Harwood Academic Publishers.

1999   Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in Indonesia. *Cultural Anthropology* 4(3):295-322.

2000   Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42(1):149 - 179.

In press Masyarakat Adat, Difference, and the Limits of Recognition in Indonesia's Forest Zone. *Modern Asian Studies....*

Peluso, Nancy, 1991,
The Ironwood Problem: (Mis)Management and Development of an Extractive Rainforest Product. *Conseervation Biology* 6(2):1-10.

1992, The Political Ecology of Extraction and Extractive Reserves in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. *Development and Change (Oct).*

1992   *Rich Forests, Poor People.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Poffenberger, Mark (ed.), 1990,
Keepers of the Forest: Land Management Alternatives in Southeast Asia. Kumarian Press, West Hartwood.

2000   *Communities and Forest Management in SouthEast Asia.* IUCN, Gland.

Persoon, Gerard, 1985,
From Affluence to Poverty: the 'Development' of Tribal and Isolated Peoples. In: Leen Boer, Dieke Bujis and Benno Galjart (Eds.) *Poverty and Interventions: Case Studies from Developing Countries,* Leiden Development Studies No. 6, Institute of Cultural and Social Studies, Leiden University: 89-110.

Robison, Richard, 1986,
Indonesia: the rise of capital. Allen and Unwin, Sydney.

San Afri Awang, 2001
Gurat Hutan Rakyat di Kapur Selatan. DEBUT Press, Jakarta.

SEAFMN, 1993,
Communities and Forest Management in East Kalimantan: Pathway to Environmental Stability. Centre for Southeast Asia Studies, University of Berkeley, California.

Thoolen, Hans (ed.), 1987,
Indonesia and the Rule of Law: Twenty Years of the 'New Order' Government. International Commission of Jurists and Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Frances Pinter (Publishers), London.

Wallace, Jude, Parlindungan, AP, and Hutagalung, Arie S.
1997   Indonesian Land Law and Tenures – Issues in Land Rights. Land Administration Project. Government of the Republic of Indonesia, National Planning Agency and National Land Agency, Jakarta.

Wright, Warren, 1999, Final Report on the Review of the Basic Agrarian Law 1960. Indonesia: Land Administration Project. www.worldbank.org

WRM, 1989,

Rainforest Destruction: Causes, Effects and False Solutions. Penang.

Zerner, Charles,1990

Community Rights, Customary Law and the Law of Timber Concessions in Indonesia's Forests: Legal Options and Alternatives in Designing the Commons. Ms.

1992,   Indigenous Forest-Dwelling Communities in Indonesia's Outer Islands: Livelihood, Rights and Environmental Management Institutions in the Era of Industrial Forest Exploitation. Paper for Forest Sector Review, World Bank, Washington DC.

Bridging the gap. To be successful, the government has to address the gaps among the four-way components of digitization: hardware or infostructure, software, policy environment and human resource. Each of these components are key to an open and innovative ecosystem. A setback in any of these components can affect the other components, which could eventually only lead to failure. There are several ways by which the government can foster digitization. Most critical is changing the analog mindset of bureaucrats. A determined ICT champion that reports directly to the agency head is key in evangel Colchester M (2001) Bridging the gap: challenges to community forestry networking in indonesia. CIFOR, Bogor. www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/cf/indonesia_cf.pdf. Accessed 25 Jan 2015. Â Indonesia-European Union Joint Implementation Committee (2016) Indonesia and EU agree to start the FLEGT licensing scheme for verified legal timber products on 15 November 2016 [Press Release]. http://www.mfp.or.id. Irawati R, Melati, Purnomo H (2009) Analysis of value chain governance: scenarios to develop small-scale furniture producers.