A Philosophical Inquiry into
an Emotional Motivation for Global Justice:
Based on a Critical Reflection on David Miller’s Arguments

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I. Introduction

Globalization is progressing all over the world, which means that the market expands and integrates economic activities beyond national boundaries in the pursuit of greater efficiency. Above all, since the end of the Cold War, various attempts have been made to integrate global markets more comprehensively. Furthermore, these attempts have been linked with a movement to reduce the constraining impact of national boundaries as far as possible and even to eliminate those boundaries entirely where possible.

However, in recent years, some distortions caused by such integrative movements have become obvious. In particular, as an apparent economic deadlock begins to grow, more xenophobic forms of nationalism have emerged, for example, in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, as well as in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, leading to a call to reconsider multicultural and immigration policies, symbolized in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s remark that “multiculturalism has totally failed.” In recent years, it is also noticeable that relatively large-scale so-called “national minorities” such as those in Scotland, Flanders, and Catalonia are actively seeking to withdraw from their particular national political institution (nation-state). Furthermore, it is plausible to say that the issues of “Brexit” or the “Trump Phenomenon” in the United States, and the emergence of right-wing populism in Europe, are an extension of these socio-political trends.

In my opinion, this emerging momentum, involving an increasingly chauvinistic nationalism and a retreat from tolerant multiculturalist policies, can be seen as a consequence of advancing world-wide neo-liberal globalization. More than half-a-
century ago, Karl Polanyi argued in his *The Great Transformation* that one of the underlying causes of World War II had been “protectionism,” arising as an inevitable consequence of more open borders that had begun to develop from the late 19th century on. As the domestic economic structure of a particular country changes due to more open borders, an opposition campaign inevitably develops to address the subsequent destabilizing effects. Polanyi called this response the “self-protection of society” (Polanyi 2001). Although his arguments related to “globalization” at the beginning of the 20th century, a situation similar to the one he described can be readily seen in relation to the early 21st century. Assuming the comparison is apt, it appears that the more barriers are lowered between countries to promote the freer movement of goods and services, the more negative the consequences can be, leading to a form of “self-protection of society,” involving, at least in part, xenophobic and defensive nationalism (see Hage 2003).

I believe that an effective response to such “self-protection of society” trends in the world is to allow national economies and nation-states to be regenerated in an appropriate manner. Various scholars, especially economists (see Reich 2012; Rodric 2011; Stiglitz 2012; Todd 2008), have raised many concerns about more open borders. Nonetheless, the apparently developing global trend is still towards even more open borders and a post-nation-states system, and it has been claimed that globalization and the end of nation-states are to be the “fate” of the world (see Gamble 2000).

However, before we accept such a doctrine of “fate,” it is important to step back from this faith in the inevitable advance of globalization, to look at the influences and consequences of globalization calmly, and to examine the significance of the nation-states system, namely “multi-nationalism,” normatively. From this perspective, I have defended the validity of another liberal conception of world order in which diverse nations can have a separate and fair existence, and have argued that regenerating national economies and nation-states in an appropriate manner and ensuring that effective social justice and social welfare systems are functioning would be necessary conditions for the implementation of successful policies of multicultural tolerance (see Shirakawa 2012, 2014).

The philosophy at the core of this kind of conception of world order is the idea of “self-determination,” that people should determine their own destinies and that a nation is such a group of people who aspire to self-determination. However, an issue arises in relation to nations that lack the capacity for self-determination, due to various circumstances, even if they seek autonomy, and indeed many nations cannot enjoy self-determination. One of the reasons underlying the possibility for a fair territorial division of nations lies in the possible compatibility between a position that respects the self-determination of other nations and a particular nation’s own self-
determination. In other words, the justification of a particular nation’s self-determination depends on other nations also having their self-determination respected. Therefore, if nations want to enjoy their own self-determination, they must be prepared in some way to facilitate conditions necessary to aid other nations that cannot enjoy self-determination. In other words, the logic of this situation creates a problem concerning transnational assistance obligations (duties of global justice).

In response to such a problem, what kind of normative conception of global justice can be derived, in terms of emphasizing the self-determination of nations? Concerning arguments about the foundations of transnational duties of assistance, for example, some theorists have developed the idea of “liberal cosmopolitanism,” which re-interprets and applies John Rawls’s theory of justice at the global society level, while other theorists have developed “Kantian cosmopolitanism,” which is oriented towards a global implementation of so-called “negative duties” (which are related to the “global harm principle”), but these arguments are not readily compatible with the idea of national self-determination (see Shirakawa 2015). Rather, it is among theorists of “liberal nationalism,” particularly in the work of one of its representative figures, David Miller, that discussion based on obligations of justice extending beyond national boundaries is derived from a position that emphasizes the self-determination of nations.

One of the central assertions of liberal nationalism concerning social justice is that, to realize equality in society, there must be a “sensitivity,” involving a sense of trust or solidarity, which is based on the sharing of a “national culture” among members of the society. It is due to this “sensitivity,” that is, to a specific set of affections and emotional ties, that each member of a particular society can regard a framework of social justice as “ours,” giving that framework positive support and remaining sustainably attached to it. Therefore, liberal nationalists, including Miller, typically argue that as national cultures differ, conceptions of social justice also differ, and so it would be appropriate that conceptions of social justice be pluralistic and distinctive.

Theorists who advocate for versions of so-called “cosmopolitanism” often argue that liberal nationalists, who have a culturally distinctive idea of social justice, lack a firm theoretical basis to their conception of global justice, which I consider to be a misguided criticism. In response to such criticism, as we will see in the following, Miller (2007) distinguishes between domestic “social justice” and external “global justice” in principle, and he grounds the foundation of the duties of “global justice” in ensuring “basic human rights.” In his understanding, international society as a whole has obligations to deal together with matters infringing “basic human rights” that anyone on Earth should be able to enjoy, and, in this sense, he argues for a certain form of “weak cosmopolitanism.”
I agree to some extent with Miller’s account of social justice and global justice as involving different conceptions in principle. I also sympathize with his account of “weak cosmopolitanism.” However, I am less persuaded by the logic through which Miller derives the concept of “weak cosmopolitanism.” My objection relates to a perceived incongruity in Miller’s position in that he only appeals to “basic human rights” as an objective and abstract principle when he argues for a foundation in relation to the duties of global justice.

One of the central claims of liberal nationalism is that, since an interpretation of the principles of justice differs for each nation, then principles of justice in this context do not function stably and sustainably based on a “rationality” or on an objective and abstract principled foundation, but rather rely on appeals to “sensitivity,” involving emotional ties among fellow citizens or their co-national solidarity. Given this perspective, in my view it follows that a conception of global justice will not work sustainably unless motivated not by some abstract and universal principle like “human rights” but by some type of “sensitivity.” Miller does not argue for an “emotional motivation” for global justice, and, consequently, his idea of global justice is less inherently derived from the justice arguments of liberal nationalism theory.\(^1\)

In the following discussion, I aim to clarify the theoretical gap within Miller’s account of different principles in relation to social justice and global justice, and that, therefore, his idea of global justice is less inherently derived from the justice arguments of liberal nationalism theory. I will then attempt to complement and modify his argument by referring to Richard Rorty’s insights, especially his concept involving “sympathy” for others’ suffering as an emotional motivation for global justice. This line of thinking will provide a means to set out a normative theory of justice between nations in a multinational world.

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\(^1\) I have criticized Yael Tamir, another representative liberal nationalist, on the same score, especially contesting her idea of “multinationalism” (see Shirakawa 2009, 2012: ch.7). Tamir’s arguments on social justice are similar to Miller’s, and she also highlights the importance of a “feeling of relatedness” to motivate a principle of social justice (Tamir 1995). Nonetheless, when referring to regional (transnational) political and economic institutions of “multinationalism,” she does not mention an emotional motivation at all in support of these institutions, although in these institutions there would be substantial exchanges of goods between particular nations that presume well-founded support for these exchanges. In my view, she is not coherent as a liberal nationalist in not applying an emotional component to her discussion here.
II. David Miller’s Theory of Global Justice:
A Principled Distinction between Social Justice and Global Justice

1. “Nationality” as a Foundation of Social Justice

Miller’s primary research interest concerns exploring a normative principle of social justice in relation to defending market socialism. Miller develops his own argument while discussing the problem of so-called “liberal” theories of social justice (including libertarian ones), for example, Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*. Among his various critiques, what I take as significant is his argument that liberal theorists tend to lose sight of the problem of “motivation” as a ground for social justice. As he says,

> It is no use viewing government as a benign perpetual motion machine that will turn out whichever policies we deem to be appropriate. We must give some account of the human agents who have in practice to turn its wheel (who they are, how they are related, what motivates them) (Miller 1989 b: 227 (italics added)).

For Miller, what motivates people to take duties of social justice seriously is a communal tie, indeed, a shared sense of national identity or “nationality.” For redistribution policies to work well, as he insists, people must be bonded by a common emotional tie, that is, by a strong common-felt sense of belonging to their nation. Unless there is already a strong sympathy for poor and unfortunate people in a society, a redistribution of goods in that society is unlikely to function satisfactorily. According to him,

> Trust assumes particular importance if we ask about the conditions under which individuals will give their support to schemes of social justice, particularly schemes involving redistribution to those not able to provide for their needs through market transactions. States which in this sense aim to be welfare states and at the same time to win democratic legitimation must be rooted in communities whose members recognize such obligations of justice to one another (Miller 1995: 93).

Here I should emphasize that Miller seeks a motivation for social justice within

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2) Miller has already argued in his *Social Justice*, published in 1976, that an egalitarian conception of justice works only in a community maintaining a relationship of intimacy and solidarity among its members (Miller 1976: 334).
a certain “sensitivity,” such as in “sympathy” for others who are in unfortunate circumstances or in a sense of “trust” and “fellow-feeling” between co-nationals. This is in stark contrast with, for example, Rawls’s account of the “two principles of justice.” For Rawls, principles of justice are chosen by individuals as pure agents of choice behind a “veil of ignorance” using “rationality” (see Rawls 1971; see also Shirakawa 2012: ch.1). According to Miller, in order for there to be not only a viable conception of social justice, but a political framework that enables social cooperation to work well, what is required is a “social” institution “whose principles must accommodate natural sentiments towards relatives, colleagues, and so forth, and which must rely on a complex set of motives to get people to comply with its requirements - motives such as love, pride, and shame as well as purely rational conviction” (Miller 1995: 58 (italics added)).

As Miller argues, for the moment it is not possible to express such “sensitivity” other than through belonging to a nation. He cites the existence of “public culture” including common meanings and understandings that form essential backgrounds for a principle of social justice. “Public culture” is “a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together” (Miller 1995: 26) and “a set of ideas about the character of the community which also helps to fix responsibilities” (Miller 1995: 68). Therefore, it can be said that “public culture” is a set of feelings and social meanings involving shared experiences without necessarily requiring conscious reflection, and, as such, it may provide a clue for exploring a plausible conception of social justice. The possession of this public culture is said to be a feature of the community called a nation.

Other liberal nationalists also emphasize that a principle of justice presupposes some emotional connection among people who support it. For example, according to Tamir, a “conception of distributive justice is only meaningful in states that do not see themselves as voluntary associations but as ongoing and relatively closed communities whose members share a common fate. Within such communities, members develop mutual attachments that supply the moral justifications required for assuming mutual obligations, without which the idea of a ‘caring state’ is unsustainable” (Tamir 1993: 117-118).

Here I want to offer a brief overview of other features of a “nation,” mainly relying on Miller’s arguments, especially taking into consideration differences from other entities. A “nation” is “a community of people with an aspiration to be politically self-determining.” Therefore, a nation is a group of people with a clear intention to decide their own fate who want their own political institutions (states) to realize this intention. Furthermore, a “state” means the set of political institutions that they aspire to possess for themselves (Miller 1995: 19). Other entities such as “ethnic groups” are distinguished from a “nation,” because they require not political self-determination in a strict sense but appropriate recognition from existing states (Miller 2000: 127-128; see also Kymlicka 1995: ch.2). In reality, almost all nations consist of several ethnic groups. From this fact, we can see that a national identity is in principle compatible with identities that derive from other attachments, such as ethnicity or religion. This means that nationality is, at least in principle, more...
It is a feature of people sharing “public culture” that they belong to the same nation and recognize each other as members of a culturally homogeneous group involving continuous cooperation with each other in diverse everyday situations, together supporting what they perceive as “our” society. Therefore, according to Miller, in principle, the basic unit of social justice must involve the nation and be located within national units, for social justice to be best accomplished. Furthermore, since public cultures differ between nations, so do the interpretations of obligations borne by members of particular nations differ, meaning that a conception of social justice basically differs from one nation to another (Miller 1999 a: 18-19; see also Walzer 1983). As Miller insists,

If we believe in social justice and are concerned about winning democratic support for socially just policies, then we must pay attention to the conditions under which different groups will trust one another, so that I can support your just demand on this occasion knowing that you will support my just demand at some future moment. Trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide (Miller 1995: 140).

2. “Basic Human Rights” as a Foundation of Global Justice

Miller’s theory of global justice relies on the extension of a theory of culturally pluralistic arguments for social justice, as discussed. Unlike advocates of so-called “liberal cosmopolitanism” (or “Rawlsian cosmopolitanism”), for example, Brian Barry (1973, 1999), Charles Beitz (1999 [1979]), and Thomas Pogge (1989), Miller is opposed to a certain conception of global distributive justice through reinterpreting Rawls’s “difference principle” to apply at the global level (see Miller 2000: 172-174; Miller 2007: ch.2). He considers that a conception of social justice varies from one nation to another. Therefore, enlarging the coverage of a principle of social justice, located properly at a national level, to a global level necessitates the imposition comprehensive than exclusive, because a “nation” leaves considerable room for particular cultures to thrive within itself. Moreover, nationality is flexible, because its definition and interpretation are always open to deliberation between co-nationals (Miller 1995: 44-46).

5 ) According to Miller, “the welfare state-and indeed, programmes to protect minority rights-have always been national projects, justified on the basis that members of a community must protect one another and guarantee one another equal respect” (Miller 1995: 187 (italics in the original)).

6 ) Therefore, in Miller’s view, for social justice to function stably, it is necessary to commit to the nation-state more strongly than classical liberals have recognized (see Miller 1994: 159, see also Miller 1989 a).
of a specific national form of social justice onto other communities. On the other hand, he does not support Thomas Nagel’s argument (Nagel 2005) that, since the duty of justice only applies among those who act in the name of the people and who are subject to the same sovereign power requiring the rule of law to be observed, then in situations in which global sovereignty does not exist, a duty of global justice cannot exist (Miller 2007: 276-279, Miller 2009: 30-31). For him, a principle of social justice that primarily reflects the national culture of a particular society and is appropriate only for the people belonging to that society, and a principle of global justice that is “valid across the different religious, moral, and political cultures that we find in the contemporary world” (Miller 2007: 164-165) must each be separately justified as normative principles. According to Miller,

Social justice and global justice are different concepts, and in order to understand global justice correctly, we need to focus attention on the nature of relationships between people across the globe who at the same time belong to different national communities. But in saying this, I am not rejecting the idea of global justice outright. On the contrary, wealthier states especially may be subject to quite demanding obligations for global justice, either to intervene to protect human rights outside of their borders or to forgo some part of their bargaining advantage in international negotiations in the name of transactional fairness (Miller 2009: 30 (italics added); see also Miller 1999 b, 2000: ch.7, 2007).

Given this context, what could ground and justify a conception of global justice? Miller argues that it is the protection of “basic human rights” that “specify a global minimum that people everywhere are entitled to as a matter of justice, and

7) Miller criticized Beitz’s arguments in his On Nationality and insists on the following: “The picture of international justice that I have sketched portrays a world in which nation-states are self-determining, but respect the self-determination of others through obligations of non-interference and in some cases of aid. This is very different from the picture presented by, for example, Charles Beitz, who argues that we are justified in regarding the world as a single scheme of co-operation, and who therefore conceives international justice in Rawlsian terms. In particular, he argues for applying the Rawlsian difference principle internationally. It follows from the Beitz position that states would have an obligation to accept outside economic management in the event that this proved to be the most effective way of raising the living standards of the worst-off members of the poorer states. In the present picture there is no general obligation to help poorer states (Equally, of course, there is no prohibition on a state deciding to do this on humanitarian or other grounds)” (Miller 1995: 107-108).

8) For Nagel, “the idea of global justice without a world government is a chimera” (Nagel 2005: 115).
that therefore may impose obligations, on rich nations especially” (Miller 2007: 166). He then defines “basic human rights” in terms of “needs.” Thus, he distinguishes between “societal needs” and “basic needs.” The former comprise “the more expansive set of requirements for a decent life in the particular society to which a person belongs” and are “used to justify the rights of citizenship,” which guarantee “someone’s position as a full member of a particular society.” The latter are “to be understood as the conditions for decent human life in any society” and relate to the necessary conditions for subsistence including, more concretely, food and water, physical security, shelter, health care, and education (Miller 2007: 178-185 (italics in the original)).

What is important here is that, according to Miller, “basic needs” are objective and universal indicators for identifying what “basic human rights” consist of, which are found “as the intersection of all sets of societal needs” and are also defined in “activities that humans engage in that are reiterated across different contexts and activities such as working, playing, learning, and raising families.” In other words, basic needs are “core human activities,” which are found in all human societies beyond differences of cultures, traditions, and ages among various groups (Miller 2007: 184 (italics in the original)). He argues that only these needs identify and justify “human rights by fixing on universal features of human beings that can serve as a ground of these rights” (Miller 2007: 178). Therefore, “basic human rights” grounded in “human needs” are the minimum rights that people in any society should enjoy, with an implication that we have a “general obligation to support and aid other human beings regardless of political or cultural boundaries” (Miller 1999 b: 179) in those societies that cannot guarantee these rights to their fellow citizens for various reasons to do with poverty or conflicts, for example. According to Miller,

I have argued, for example, against the cosmopolitan view that our responsibilities to the world’s poor are in principle exactly the same as our responsibilities to our fellow-citizens. We do not, then, owe them everything that we owe our compatriots as a matter of social justice. In particular, whatever global justice means, it does not mean global equality-of resources, opportunity, welfare, etc.-so we are not required to change the global order in such a way that inequalities between societies are levelled completely. On the other hand, I have defended the idea of a global minimum that is due to every human being as a

9) Miller argues that human rights “identify forms of treatment that everyone is owed, regardless of what is happening to others,” and a person is entitled to have the rights “whether or not other people are currently enjoying these rights.” Therefore, the principle of human rights is related to “noncomparative principles of justice” (Miller 1999 b: 169-171).
matter of justice, a minimum best understood as a set of basic human rights. Since many societies are presently unable to guarantee these rights to their own members, it appears that the responsibility to protect them may fall on outsiders (Miller 2007: 231).

III. Critical Reflection

1. A Logical Inconsistency in Miller’s Arguments: The Problem of “Motivation” for Global Justice

As discussed, Miller adopts a dualist approach to explain how social justice and global justice work according to different principles and grounds a principle of global justice in “basic human rights” that must be universally guaranteed beyond specific cultural contexts. Some critics have argued against him that social justice and global justice should not be distinguished using different principles. For example, in discussions concerning Rawlsian liberal cosmopolitanism, the reason the “difference principle” can be expanded globally rests on the assumption that the “original position,” which Rawls hypothetically used when deriving the principle, is not necessarily limited to a national society. Using an assumption of a global “original position” allows for the same principle to be applied to individuals across nations (see for example Beitz 1979; see also Shirakawa 2012: 38-41). Tatsuo Inoue has also argued that “justice that can stop discrimination and corruption, that is, a principle of justice as a normative principle to criticize fraud” cannot fundamentally “stop at being a national justice theory but has no choice but to be promoted as a theory of global justice” (Inoue 2012: 19 (English translation by the author)). ¹⁰ In short, these theorists insist that, rather than presenting the argument as a type of “two-story” theory that requires social justice and global justice to have separate principles as with Miller, a theory of justice needs to be “one-story,” involving a single comprehensive principle for both national and global justice.

Whether to conceive a principle of social justice and one of global justice as separate certainly seems to be a very important issue, and indeed it is one of the main moot points in the “cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.” However, in relation to a culturally distinctive view of social justice such as Miller’s, a principle of global justice does not simply entail a globally expanded principle of social justice. Therefore, when Miller distinguishes between two principles of justice and adopts

¹⁰ In addition, Pogge (2001) also makes the criticism that distinguishing principles of social justice from those of global justice and “subjecting the global economic order to weaker moral demands than any national economic order” is a “double standard.” However, I should note that his criticism here is directed against Rawls’s arguments on “the laws of peoples” rather than Miller’s arguments.
dualism, this approach is not theoretically unreasonable, regardless of any normative preference. Miller’s theory of global justice can be critically evaluated as his response to the cosmopolitans to show that it is possible to provide a persuasive argument for global justice while defending a culturally distinctive idea of social justice. However, what I consider flawed in Miller’s account is his attempt to ground a principle of global justice in “basic human rights,” which are founded on “core human activities,” while being satisfied with “basic needs” as objective and universal indicators.

As discussed in section II.1, when Miller considers social justice, he focuses on the “motivation” that underpins a principle of social justice. He proceeds to argue that “motivation” is not a reason or an abstract principle, but a type of “sensitivity” involving a communal tie and a sense of solidarity or trust among members of the community. In my view, that is one of the central insights of liberal nationalism. In other words, one of the core arguments of a theory of liberal nationalism is that, for a stable and sustainable political framework of liberal democracy to exist, the motivation and support of people who share a sense of solidarity or a sense of trust is required. These sensibilities are brought about by a co-national sense of belonging (“nationality”), which includes comprehensive social bonds arising from family relationships, social classes, religion, and ethnicity.\(^1\)

Therefore, there is an apparent inconsistency within arguments based on a theory of liberal nationalism, at least in Miller’s case, because he emphasizes, on the one hand, an emotional motivation as regards national social justice, but, on the other hand, does not engage with any emotionally motivational aspects and only appeals to the abstract and objective principle of “basic human rights,” in relation to a principle of justice within global society (see also Se 2012: 144-145).

Miller might reject my assertion because he could claim that social justice and global justice are qualitatively different, which means that whereas social justice is an egalitarian principle, requiring co-nationality and a sense of solidarity as incentives to encourage fair distribution of goods, global justice is not an egalitarian principle and so does not require support through a particular sensitivity or emotional motivation. Indeed, his conception of global justice is seemingly, in principle, a minimum one that only guarantees the “basic human rights” of people, so it is a “thin” rather than a “thick” conception of cosmopolitanism.\(^2\) However, as Miller himself admits, on this “thin” conception of global justice, people, especially those

\(^1\) Margaret Canovan, who is regarded as a representative liberal nationalist, insists that nationality is a so-called “battery” that makes the political framework of liberal democracy stable and sustainable (Canovan 1996: 80).

\(^2\) The meanings of the words “thick” and “thin” are derived from Michael Walzer’s works (Walzer 1994).
in wealthy countries, need to be committed to “quite demanding obligations for
global justice” (Miller 2009: 30 (italics added)), involving a transnational relocation
of goods and resources. If this is the case, then for people to undertake and fulfill
any such obligations, a principle of global justice also needs support from people
motivated by some type of “sensitivity” rather than by a purely abstract and objec-
tive principle.

2. A Possible Motivation for Global Justice through “Sympathy” for Others’
Sufferings: Based on Richard Rorty’s Arguments

One of the reasons Miller grounds (or may have no choice but to ground) a
principle of global justice in an abstract and objective principle such as “basic hu-
man rights” is that he implicitly assumes that it is impossible to locate within an in-
ternational community something like a “sensitivity” that could support a principle
of global justice. However, this may not be necessarily the case. In the following
discussion, I highlight the possibility that “sympathy” for others’ sufferings can be
one of the “sensitivities” motivating global justice, but that is nevertheless qualita-
tively different from the “sensitivity” motivating social justice. Through this discus-
sion, I would like to modify and complement Miller’s theory of global justice.

Initially, I want to draw attention to arguments claiming that avoiding “suffer-
ings” and “cruelty” for human beings should be the first purpose of liberalism. One
representative theorist for this approach is Judith Shklar, who is known as an advo-
cate of “the liberalism of fear.” The political philosophy of liberalism, according to
her, has focused only on the issue of “justice,” such as would be involved with a
just distribution of goods, for example, and has not paid attention to “injustice”
(Shklar 1992). Therefore, she advocates “the liberalism of fear” to promote a “liber-
alism with cruelty as the first vice.” “Cruelty” is, in her understanding, “the deliber-
ate infliction of physical and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or
group by stronger ones in order to achieve some end,” and consequently, “the liber-
alism of fear makes a universal and especially cosmopolitan claim” to avoid such
cruelty” (Shklar 1989: 29).

Poor and vulnerable people often suffer not so much from intentional actions
but rather from inadequately considered and even unconscious actions of other peo-
ple, especially those in rich countries. However, Shklar’s concept of “cruelty” is
limited to sufferings caused intentionally. Therefore, I would like to focus attention
on Richard Rorty’s arguments since he accepts and develops Shklar’s argument that
“cruelty is the worst thing we can do.” For Rorty, avoiding “cruelty” means not
only “causing no harm” but also “using no resources needed by those less advant-
taged,” which means his concept of “cruelty” is wider than that of Shklar and in-
cludes addressing unintentional sufferings caused by others (Rorty 1989: xiii-xvi).
More significantly, Rorty argues that a “sensitivity” that perceives the “cruelty” of others will be an important momentum to generate solidarity among strangers. For him, “recognition of common susceptibility to humiliation is the only social bond that is needed”; therefore, “what unites her with the rest of the species is not common language but just susceptibility to pain and in particular to that special sort of pain which the brutes do not share with the humans - humiliation” (Rorty 1989: 91-92 (italics in original)). In other words, through sensitivity to “cruelty” that people unknown to us suffer, we can sympathize and identify with them. In this emotionally grounded process, we can think of other human beings not as “them” but as “one of us.” As Rorty says,

Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking, “They do not feel it as we would,” or “There must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer?” (Rorty 1989: xvi (italics in the original))

It is neither irrational nor unintelligent to draw the limits of one’s moral community at a national, or racial, or gender border. But it is undesirable- morally undesirable. So it is best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger variety of people and things (Rorty 1999: 81 (italics in the original))

For Rorty, cultivating one’s ability to sympathize with the sufferings of others, which Annette Baier called “a progress of sentiments” (Baier 1991), leads to a cosmopolitan accommodation of “human rights” (in his words, “human rights culture”). Therefore, he emphasizes the importance of a “sentimental education” (Rorty 1993). Such sensitivity, according to him, could be developed not “by theory” but by getting familiar with any source that “tells us in detail about sufferings which people whom we have not paid attention to so far endure,” as is detailed in literature, articles written by journalists, movies, documentary dramas, and other areas of human-focused creativity (Rorty 1989: xvi).

What I want to highlight is Rorty’s point that such “sympathy” for others means being aware of even our “little, superficial similarity” (Rorty 1993: 129) with others. Therefore, “sympathy” for the sufferings of others does not only recognize differences among various groups but could be a basis for a “thin” cosmopolitan sense of solidarity, which comprehends such differences. If this is the case, then such sensitivity would not conflict with or supersede a co-national sense of belong-
In my view, “sympathy for the sufferings of others” brings about a thin-level consciousness of solidarity, while at the same time allowing for differences among people. Therefore, such sensitivity could work to underpin duties of global justice to improve the human rights of otherwise distant strangers. In other words, through reference to Shklar and Rorty’s arguments, the duties of global justice within international society could be supported and motivated not by an abstract and objective principle but by a certain “sensitivity” that is logically consistent with the theorizing of liberal nationalism.

IV. Conclusion

In this article, from the perspective of motivations concerning global justice, I have critically reviewed the theory of global justice of the British political philosopher David Miller. I have pinpointed a theoretical inconsistency in his argument and consequently tried to modify and complement Miller’s argument by referring mainly to Rorty’s ideas concerning “sympathy” for the sufferings of others.

First, I provided an overview of Miller’s social justice theory and its relation to global justice. For Miller, to realize social justice, a “sensitivity” involving a sense of trust or a sense of solidarity based on sharing “public culture” is necessary among members of a society. It is because such a sensitivity exists that people in a society are prepared to consider a political institution embodying social justice as “ours” and to offer affective support to it. From my point of view, one of the core insights of liberal nationalist justice theory concerns the significance of emotional

13) Charles Webel and Sofia Khaydari try to ground global ethics in “non-violence” from a viewpoint of the insights from peace studies and conflict studies (see Webel and Khaydari 2016). I believe that “non-violence” must be a highly sublime value, but based on my arguments above, the sympathy for others’ sufferings and vulnerabilities must underlie the importance of “non-violence.” In addition, such sensitivity also could be “narratives” for grounding global ethics (see Salamon 2016).

14) Lynn Hunt, a historian of the French Revolution, reveals from a historical-sociological perspective that for a society to accept and accommodate the idea of human rights, it is important whether this idea appeals to people’s emotions. According to her, the Enlightenment philosophers at the time of the French Revolution had recognized this, and she insists, by quoting an argument from Diderot, that without “interior feeling” shared broadly among people in a society, they cannot really accept an idea of human rights. In other words, she argues that “the claim of self-evidence relies ultimately on an emotional appeal; as it is convincing if it strikes a chord within each person” (Hunt 2007: pp.26-27). I strongly agree with her, and I think that if human rights invoke some moral duties towards others, this is not because they exercise their influence as an abstract principle but because they have struck the chords of people’s hearts.
motivations that must underpin any principle of social justice. On the other hand, Miller argues that the principles involved in social justice are qualitatively different from those of global justice and that global justice is grounded in requirements to guarantee “basic human rights” as a global minimum for a decent life in any society. Therefore, he grounds global justice in “basic human rights,” while grounding social justice in co-national solidarity. From my perspective, these arguments seem to be inconsistent as arguments based on a theory of liberal nationalism. Miller emphasizes, on the one hand, an emotional motivation as regards national social justice, but, on the other hand, he does not engage with an emotional motivation and only appeals to an abstract and objective principle such as “basic human rights” concerning a grounding principle of justice within international society.

Whether it takes the form of social justice or global justice, for justice to be realized in a certain community, the members of that community are required to accept certain burdens or, to use a much stronger term, certain “sacrifice.” Jean-Pierre Dupuy reveals that such a “circumstance of sacrifice” is not assumed in the argument of the Rawlsian theory of justice (Dupuy 1992: ch.4). However, in my understanding, liberal nationalists, including Miller, have argued correctly that it is not enough to appeal only to rationality or abstract principles for people in a society to accept such a “circumstance of sacrifice.” For example, Will Kymlicka argues that

History suggests that people are willing to make sacrifices for kin and for co-religionists, but are only likely to accept wider obligations under certain conditions. In particular, there must be some sense of common identity and common membership uniting donor and recipient, such that sacrifices for “one of us.”

Also, there must be a high level of trust that sacrifices will be reciprocated: i.e. that if one makes sacrifices for the needy today, that one’s own need will be taken care of later. Liberal nationalists argue that national identity has provided this common identity and trust, and that no other social identity in the modern world has been able to motivate ongoing sacrifices (as opposed to episodic humanitarian assistance in times of emergency) beyond the level of kin groups and confessional groups (Kymlicka 2001: 225 (italics added)).

Therefore, an investigation is required to specify what type of sensitivity or emotional tie would facilitate people in an international society to accept sacrifices on behalf of distant strangers. I then argued, mainly in reference to Rorty’s arguments, that cultivating “sympathy” for others’ sufferings could establish a sense of solidarity with people who otherwise live at great distances and foster a perception of “them” as “our fellows,” and that this kind of emotional motivation could under-
pin a principle of global justice. By these arguments, I would hope to make Miller’s arguments more logically consistent and compelling, based on a theory of liberal nationalism.

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**References**


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Emotional intelligence matters for motivation, and motivation matters for success. Superior emotional intelligence is an important element in the prevention of decision making based on emotional biases, whereas lower EI can create anxiety and lead to poor decisions. It’s not about removing emotions completely from the decision-making process, rather it’s about recognizing the emotions that are unrelated to the problem and not allowing them to be influential to the final result. Negative emotions can impede problem-solving and decision making both in the workplace and personal circumstances. Most approaches to global justice are developed within bounded philosophical traditions. One problem is that each offers contributions to global justice that is constricted by the narrow bounds of their particular tradition. A global philosophy is then a more unbound philosophy, better suited for a globalized world. Our world is ever-changing with ideas and people travelling as never before. It offers a critical examination of judgement and normative validity in the recent works of Rawls, Habermas, Ackerman, Michaleman, and Dworkin. Ferrara demonstrates how the understanding of justice and normative validity, since the linguistic turn in philosophy, is defined in terms of reflective judgement.